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Chapter 4 
Status is Cultural: Durkheimian Poles and Weberian 
Russians Seek Great Power Status1 
Iver B. Neumann 
Like its etymological twin, − the state, status emerges within a specific cultural 
context or, in order better to better capture the importance of relations between 
polities, a civilizational context. According to Durkheim and Mauss, “[a] civilization 
constitutes a kind of moral milieu encompassing a certain number of nations, each 
national culture being only a particular form of the whole.”2 Status-seeking between 
any groups of polities takes place in a specific social context. What Durkheim and 
Mauss had in mind was Christendom. 
The historical fact that the state system grew out of Christendom and a 
Christian legal code (first ius gentium, then ius inter gentes) has repercussions not 
only for thosewho were left status-less, but also for how status was conferred within 
the system. Conflict over status played itself out as a discussion of which king was 
closest to God.3 Earthly powers were ordered in a hierarchy of descending closeness 
to God, with France on top, then other Christian rulers, then non-Christian rulers (and, 
we may add, people who were seen to be without rulers altogether). This hierarchical 
order carried over into early modernity and beyond, most recently as a “standard of 
civilization.”. 
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Cultural and civilizational analysis defines its object by what Durkheim and 
Mauss referred to as “a kind of moral milieu.” If the analysis of great power status is 
to be a global analysis, then two additional questions must be asked. The first one is 
inter-civilizational, and concerns what happens to status when the moral ground upon 
which it is sought and accommodated becomes the object of radical contestation. 
Barry Buzan has suggested that we may conceptualize the contemporary states system 
as a hybrid, where historically Christian-based international society co-exists with an 
international system that is the result of what is here called inter-civilizational 
interaction.4 We have already noted one result of this interaction: the disappearance 
from international law of an explicit “standard of civilization.” 
The second question that should be asked of any analysis of symbolic 
interaction concerns how symbolic resources are related to material resources. As 
pointed out in Chapter 1the Iintroduction to this volume, academic debates over 
relative state status within the social sciences and international relations (IR) have 
located two rather different traditions. The first tradition is the one discussed so far, 
focusing on the symbolic resource of exemplary behaviour according to some 
civilizationally -specific standard. Durkheim isIt has its perhaps its greatest 
spokesman in Durkheim, and the tradition is now dominated by constructivists. The 
second tradition hails back to Vattel, Ranke, and Weber, and is now dominated by 
realists. It focuses on degree of massed material resources.5 
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There is no obvious common ground on which these two traditions may meet. 
If status is determined by material resources alone, then civilization is an 
epiphenomenon. If status is determined by symbolic resources alone, then material 
resources are simply a prop. Two different routes for analyzing power in all its forms 
follow – including what is at stake here, namely the status of great powers – follow. 
The first route would be to analyze how civilizational characteristics are hierarchized 
according to a power logic. This approach involves introducing social approaches that 
are peripheral to established debates, and I will not follow it here.6 The alternative 
approach is to bring the two established traditions into dialog with one another. What 
follows are two exercises that clear the ground for such a dialog. 
Let us start with a nutshell history of ideas, to see how the two traditions of 
thinking status do indeed overlap, particularly in the work of Max Weber. Since I am 
not out to prove or disprove these theories, but to bring them into conversation, I need 
some extreme value cases that can allow both traditions to score points.7 
I have chosen Polish status-seeking in the interwar period as a case of the 
importance of material factors, and Russian status-seeking in the eighteenth century as 
a case of the importance of symbolic factors. Note the inter-civilizational logic of case 
choice: these are states that have historically resided on the eEastern periphery of 
Christendom. From the emergence of the modern state system, Poland was widely 
seen as being on the perimeter of Christendom. One historic study bears the telling 
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title A Suburb of Europe.8 Russia was the first outside status-seeker to engage the 
system and seek status within it, and the matter was negotiated in explicitly symbolic 
terms. Key questions in the seventeenth and well into the eighteenth century were 
whether Russia was a Christian state, and whether it was despotic.9 I do not undertake 
the analytical job of assessing which powers qualify as great powers, how, when, and 
why,10 but rather focus on methodology.; mMore specifically, I focus on how to 
Poland and Russia signalling about status – how they “make available to others a 
of what they want, to use a classical sociological formulation,11 and– particularly 
grounds they choose to signal on – and how this status signalling is faring with 
established great powers.  
The aim is not to prove or disprove the two traditions, but to assess their 
fruitfulness and complementarity. In terms of empirics, the question is how we may 
better understand Polish and Russian status-seeking and its reception by reading it in 
terms of the Durkheimian and the Weberian traditions. The answer thatconclusion I 
reach is that both traditions specify a necessary component that has to be there present 
for great power claims to be accepted, but that it takes a combination of the two for 
the claim to be felicitously received. The Polish case is a study in how great power 
claims in terms of civilizational standards are insufficient when they are not backed 
up by capabilities. The Russian case is a study in how great power claims in terms of 
Commented [AM6]: COMP: link Chapter 3 in footnote 
5 
capabilities are insufficient when they are not seen as being backed up by the 
performance of certain civilizational standards. 
<space> 
<A> Social Theorists on Greatness: Durkheim versuss. Weber 
When the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) established a system whereby the great 
powers should meet in concert to discuss and manage the topics of the day, it 
formalized a system that had taken shape over the preceding century. During the 
eighteenth century, when treaties were drawn up, particularly but not exclusively in 
the wake of wars, certain powers had retained the prerogative of guaranteeing those 
treaties to themselves. With the exception of Spain (a state that no longer commanded 
the respect it once had), the Concert of European Concert consisted of those states 
that had usually guaranteed treaties during the eighteenth century. In the sense that 
different states were held to belong to different layers whose power and hence 
importance varied, the European system of states had been hierarchical from its very 
inception. It is true that there also existed a norm of sovereign equality, which worked 
against interventions in the internal affairs of others as well asand the kind of ranking 
of individual states that had existed before the system took shape. This norm, 
however, concerned the ranking of specific states, not the ranking of layers of states. 
As pointed out in the Chapter 1Iintroduction to this volume, we treat the status 
of great power as a club good, and hence a resource. Being recognized as a great 
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power means that decision makers in other polities will take what they see as your 
interests into consideration. The great power is thus present even when absent; it 
exerts power in settings that its representatives do not even know exist. It governs 
from afar. In addition, other great powers will, at least in principle, recognize your 
rightful interests. There may also be institutional rewards, such as a position as a 
guarantor of the peace or membership in a club. For these reasons, rising states may 
aspire to great power status, and those who possess it may try to limit the number of 
additional onesgreat powers. For example, when Catherine the Great insisted that 
Russia was a great power, she was making a claim for Russia to be included in certain 
specific political processes from which great powers of the day had been trying to 
exclude it. Since there is no way for politicians or analysts to define a great power 
without intervening in this essentially political process, the concept of great power has 
remained an essentially contested one. The ensuing confusion surrounding the 
concept may be found both in historical analyses, where there are considerable yet 
rarely highlighted differences in usage, as well as in contemporary political debate.12 
The expression “great power” emerged co-terminouslyconterminously with 
the modern state system, and began life not as a concept, but as a (composite) word. 
Vattel’s definition of– a power that can stand up to any combination of others – is the 
classic one.13 Ranke’s celebrated essay on the matter encapsulates the views of the 
German Machtschule, and was so dominant throughout the entire nineteenth century 
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that I would argue that “great power” remained a word as opposed to a concept to its 
very end.14 To Ranke as to most statesmen, great powers were states that by dint of 
their economic and military might were able to maintain a sphere of influence where 
other great powers gave them a droit de regard. More specifically, Kratochwil 
identifies “the rule of a ‘great power’” as “a power with system-wide interests as well 
as a say in matters pertaining to the management of the system. Managing the security 
issues in the classic conception of politics involved largely the issues of a balance of 
power.”15 Although the great powers did not maintain the practice of meeting in 
concert for more than seven years after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, the concert 
itself survived by dint of other practices. This institutionalization of what Ranke 
meant by “great power” explains why it went largely unchallenged for so long – 
Ranke was simply read as summing up the received and hence obvious opinion (doxa) 
of the day. 
This institutionalization also explains why, on first reading, the major theorist 
of power of the early twentieth century and the immediate precursor of IR realists did 
not really add anything new on the topic of great powers. In his major work, Max 
Weber stated that: “Nowadays one usually refers to those polities that appear to be the 
bearers of power prestige as [Machtprestige] the ‘Great Powers.’”16 To Weber, 
prestige is not specific to the system of states, but is rather a general “irrational 
8 
element” towards which every polity strives. In the state system, it is relational: it 
means “the glory [Ehre] of power over other communities.”17 
The reason why this definition does not at first appear as new is that, to Weber 
as to Vattel and Ranke before him, prestige is obviously tied in with military and 
economic factors. The comparatively superior strength and the mutually recognized 
spheres of influence that are constitutive of great powers may, therefore, be seen as 
what we would now call structural characteristics of the system of states. In their eyes, 
these are characteristics of the social organization of states. Vattel and Ranke think in 
analytical terms, in the sense that what the agents themselves think is of no 
importance. It is the analyst, writing from a distance, who decides what prestige is and 
how it is distributed. Weber, on the other hand, is ambivalent on this issue. In some 
places, he writes as if the issue of prestige is analytical, whereas in others, he writes as 
if it is what the actors themselves think about prestige that is of the essence. Consider, 
for example, the following quote: “There is a close connection between the prestige of 
culture and the prestige of power.”18 To Weber, prestige of culture is an 
intersubjective phenomenon; it is a question of how cultures assess one another. ToIn 
the degree that prestige of power is tied to prestige of culture, prestige of power 
becomes not only an analytical question, but also a question of intersubjectivity. 
Intersubjective meanings depend on a game of negotiation by two or more agents. 
Seeing a great power as intersubjectively constituted by the actors of a system is a 
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very different thing from seeing it as structurally constituted by the system of states. 
Since Weber’s usage was in line with the meaning commonly ascribed to the term 
“great power,” however, this seems to have gone unnoticed at the time. A similar 
tension may be traced in what remains, arguably, the most widely used and explicitly 
realist and descriptive definition, namely that offered by Jack Levy. To him, a great 
power is a state that plays a major role in international politics with respect to 
security-related issues. The great powers can be differentiated from other states by 
their military power, their interests, their behaviour in general and interactions with 
other powers, other powers’ perception of them, and some formal criteria.19 
The existence of another meaning of the term “great power” became apparent 
only when it was spelled out in the work of the other key sociologist at the time, 
Emile Durkheim. The context was a lecture course on the state, held in 1913 but not 
published in its entirety until 1950.20 Durkheim saw the emergence of the modern 
state as emanating from a small cadre (historically, the king and his advisers). This 
state is one thing, and the society that eventually comes to rule another: “the State is 
nothing if it is not an organ distinct from the rest of society. If the State is everywhere, 
it is nowhere. The State comes into existence by a process of concentration that 
detaches a certain group of individuals from the collective mass.”21 In the beginning, 
Durkheim held, this state does not have many ties to society: “it is above all the agent 
of external relations, the agent for the acquisition of territory and the organ of 
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diplomacy.”22 The more the state grows, however, the denser its interface with 
society. Durkheim famously describes this as an organic process, whereby the head 
grows an ever more finely honed cybernetic system with which to operate its societal 
body. He maintains that this process is characteristic of the modern state from the 
seventeenth century onwards. Here we have a clear-cut criterion for gauging which 
states are “great” powers and which are not. Drawing on the concept of pride, which 
seems close to Weber’s “prestige,” Durkheim argues: 
As long as there are States, so there will be national pride, and nothing can be 
more warranted. But societies can have their pride, not in being the greatest or 
the wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized and in possessing 
the best moral constitution.23 
Durkheim’s classificatory scheme is now used by statespeople about other 
powers. To pick a recent example, during her state visit to New Delhi in 2009, U.S. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that: 
Not so long ago, the measure of a nation’s greatness was the size of its 
military, or its economic strength, or its capacity to dominate its friends and 
allies […]. But in this century – in the interconnected and interdependent 
world in which we live – greatness can be defined by the power of a nation’s 
example.24 
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The two meanings of great power appear in contemporary analytical usage as 
well. Clear-cut examples of privileging materiality over morals may be found in 
Waltz, who holds that the key characteristic of the existing international system is that 
– it, similarly to the way the system of the market produces functionally similar firms 
–, it produces units that are functionally equivalent.25 These functionally similar units 
are now nation-states, and they differ in one aspect only: their power resources. Some 
states are greater than others, and this greatness may be explained by the 
characteristics of the system itself, which differentiates between its units only at this 
very level. As William Wohlforth has argued where Russia is concerned, greatness is 
therefore a systemic characteristic.26 It has nothing to do with intersubjectivity or 
recognition, which should be treated as questions of foreign policy.27 A similarly 
clear-cut example of privileging morals may be found in Reus-Smit’s work, whose 
thrust emanates from the idea that overt institutions of IR like sovereignty are 
dependent on covert constitutional structures, which he defines as “coherent 
ensembles of intersubjective beliefs, principles, and norms that perform two functions 
in ordering international societies: they define what constitutes a legitimate actor, 
entitled to all the rights and privileges of statehood; and they define the basic 
parameters of rightful state action.”28 
Note, however, that both neo-realists and constructivists like Reus-Smit 
perform ideal-typical analytics. Empirically, the two meanings may simply not lend 
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themselves to disentanglement. To sum up, the literature on what makes a power 
“great” suggests two ideal-typical methodologies, where one highlights material 
resources, and the other civilizational standards. The only criterion for deciding which 
of these ideal types is the better one is fruitfulness – but there is no agreement on 
which is the more fruitful. We may have reached a theoretical dead end. 
Granted that civilizational standards add up to more than an epiphenomenon, 
the combination of material resources and civilizational standards is multiply 
realizable. The clearest stance on the matter in this volume is that of Deborah Larson 
and Alexei Shevchenko, who see civilizational standards as compensatory relative to 
material resources. Since this cChapter is an attempt to bring the two approaches into 
conversation, I will treat them as complementary, thus:. 
Table 4.1 Here 
 <space> 
If we follow Reus-Smit’s train of thought as outlined abovein the preceding 
paragraphs, we could argue that, in the European case, the relative weight of the 
criteria has changed, with closeness to God – a status question of civilizational 
standards – becoming relatively less important than material resources over time. 
However, during the period when closeness to God was most important, France was 
considered to be both the closest and number one in material resources, so we do not 
have the status inequality needed to disentangle the issue. 
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In the following, I will ask two questions. From the Durkheimians, I take not 
the normative question of morals, but rather the analytical one of civilization: 
Hhistorically, is it necessary and/or sufficient for a great power to belong to Western 
civilization? From the Weberians, I take the question of whether it is necessary and/or 
sufficient for a great power to command a certain amount of material resources. I 
apply those questions to two great power status-seekers at the eEastern margins of 
Europe: Poland and Russia. The periods chosen are the ones when these powers 
struggled the most to be recognized as great powers. For Poland, this means the 
interwar period in the twentieth century; for Russia, the eighteenth century. These 
cases are also felicitous because Russia principally argued its case for great power 
status on grounds of material resources, whereas Poland relied mainly on 
civilizational grounds. From the two cases we can see how these kinds of status-
seeking have fared in terms of necessity and sufficiency. 
<space> 
<A> Trust in Honor: Durkheimian Poles 
The third partition of Poland in 1795 wiped a great power off the map of Europe. In 
its heyday, the Polish-Lithuanian kingdom had stretched from the Baltic in the north 
to the Black Sea in the south, and Poland had beewasn known as “the land between 
the seas.” Even though the Polish state thus ceased to exist, what was called the Polish 
nation still remained: that was the szlachta – the Polish gentry. This group made up 
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around 8 per cent of the population, and was ethnically diverse. During the nineteenth 
century, influenced by the new ideas of a nation as an imagined community arising 
west of the areas where Polish was spoken, the szlachta was able to transform itself 
into the Polish społeczeństwo. Społeczeństwo signified “the more complex notion of 
the organized, politicized, albeit still stateless, community of all Poles, led now by an 
intelligentsia that preserved, at the same time as it modified, the values and the style 
of the old szlachta.”29 In lieu of a Polish state, the Polish intelligentsia took it upon 
themselves to furnish the civilizational leadership of the Polish nation, which since 
the 1870s they saw in organic terms. 
The Polish national romantic poet, Adam Mickievicz, had called on Polish 
patriots to “M[m]easure your powers by your purposes, not your purposes by your 
powers.” Heeding his advice, they attempted to re-establish a Polish state in 1830 and 
1863. The third-time-lucky chance to reconstitute Polish statehood came in the wake 
of the First World War (WWI)World War I. Given the historical setting and the 
weakness of Germany and Russia at the time, it comes as no surprise that most Poles 
saw the new Poland as a great power. First, the precedent was at hand historically. 
Secondly, the cultural hegemony in Poland was still held by an eélite lite that 
understood itself and legitimated its leading role as the successor of the szlachta of the 
old kingdom, which had previously been a great power. Thirdly, Poland was located 
between Germany in the west and Soviet Russia in the east, great powers both. In 
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terms of what was still, in 1919, referred to explicitly as the standard of civilization, 
Poland’s credentials were not in doubt. Poland’s status as a Christian historical nation 
was acknowledged by all concerned.30 A twenty-year-long campaign for recognition 
as a great power followed. 
At first, relative capabilities between Poland and the old great powers 
superficially seemed to accommodate the Polish position. Already in 1920, the French 
historian Louis Eisenmann noted how “I[i]t was a tragedy for Poland to have been 
reborn too weak to be a power, and strong enough to aspire to more than the status of 
a small state.”31 As a result of lost wars and internal upheavals, both German and 
Soviet Russian capabilities were temporarily weakened, and both states were having 
trouble projecting their great power images on their surroundings. The dip in German 
and Russian prestige following their World War I losses and the October Revolution 
meant that Poland could temporarily stand up to comparisons with these two great 
powers. Anton DePorte holds that, initially, the main actors in the interwar system 
perceived Poland to be “…almost a great power.”32 
The point for us is that there were enough capabilities in evidence for Poland 
to launch its campaign without falling flat immediately. Poland, a population of 
around 30 million and an army of one-a quarter of a million, was allied with France, 
claimed a sphere of influence over the Baltic states, and was strategically important as 
the door to invasion of Russia.33 
16 
Table 4.2 Here 
<space> 
Because of its weak economy, however, Poland could ill afford to keep an 
army of this size. In the 1930s, defense costs reached as much as 27.5 percent of 
government expenditure, which was high even by contemporary standards.34 Polish 
territory, which had belonged to three different political units for well over one 
hundred100 years, lacked a common infrastructure. The far northwestern part, the 
“Polish Corridor” (Pomerelia), gave Poland access to the sea, but also split Germany 
in two. Polish territory, ravaged by warfare, included few industrialized patches, and 
what economic life there was, was often shorn of its previous context and was not 
necessarily complementary. As judged by public statements, there was domestic 
consensus that Poland was a great power, whose destiny it was to play a leading role 
in the region between the German and the Russian state formations. This element was 
present not only in the 1920s, but throughout the period. In terms of defense, Poland’s 
capabilities were spread thin. The borders of the Polish state were seemingly fixed 
during the period from 1919 to 1921, but problems remained. In the northeast, Poland 
claimed the ethnically Polish city of Vilna on ethnic grounds.35 In the south, there was 
the problem of Teschen. The duchy of Teschen (Cieszyn) had a mixed Polish-Czech 
population, with Poles being in a solid majority. At the Paris Peace Conference, 
Poland was given Upper Silesia; Danzig, with its predominantly German population, 
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was made a free city. In the plebiscites held there in 1920, no less than 96.5 percent of 
the population opted to remain part of Germany.36 The Polish Corridor (Pomerelia), – 
through formerly German territory, and, together with the Free State of Danzig, thus 
cutting off East Prussia from the rest of Germany –, made Germany the only land-
based non-contiguous state in Europe. The negative impact of the Corridor on 
German–Polish relations in particular can hardly be overrated.37 
In its dealings with smaller powers, Poland tried to act the great power by 
posing itself as a fully -fledged alternative for military alliances. At the 1922 League 
of Nations conference on reparations in Genoa, Poland actually played a leading role 
among the breakaway successor states to Tsarist Russia. The reasons for this could, 
however, be traced back to the common economic interest of these states in not 
having to meet a share of the old Tsarist debts. Then, with that common interest gone, 
Poland failed to interest Lithuania in its project to organize a Baltic League later that 
year, and Lithuania’s absence contributed heavily to the downfall of that idea. 
Although Poland, Estonia, Latvia, and Finland actually signed a convention, Finland 
failed to ratify it, so the scheme came to naught. When, in 1924, a “small” Baltic 
conference comprised ofing Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania was held in Kaunas, this it 
was widely interpreted as a further blow to the Polish leadership of the successor 
states. Undeterred, Warsaw tried to build a four power Baltic alliance, but Lithuania 
proved to be an insurmountable obstacle to Polish aspirations in the Baltic. In 1934, 
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and again in 1938, the Polish foreign minister visited Estonia and Latvia, seeking to 
forge a common defense against the dangers that lurked from Germany and the Soviet 
Union. 
In the south, too, Polish attempts at forging a Central European organization 
all folded. During World War I, Beneš had found cooperation with the Poles to be 
“‘systematic, sincere, and rather successful.”38 The Teschen issue soon made 
cooperation between the two states difficult.39 When when, in 1920–1, what came to 
Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia was forged in 
1920–1921,, it was a setback for Poland. In 1927, Warsaw presented a plan for an 
“Eastern Locarno,” but it had to act on its own, and the initiative proved fruitless. 
Having established that Poland was serious in its quest for great power, and 
that the material base for this claim was weak, and that Poland failed signally in its 
somewhat panicked alliance policies, I conclude that Poland’s status-seeking was 
based on civilizational standards –, more specifically, memories of past greatness, a 
code of military honour, and a sense of maintaining old European social and political 
mores against Soviet Russia, and, after 1933, also Nazi Germany. 
Poland’s aspirations of being measured on par with Germany and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were formally challenged by the great power 
victors of World War I already in 1925, at the Congress of Locarno. To Poland and 
also Czechoslovakia, whose foreign ministers were present at Locarno but did not, to 
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humiliation, take part in the main negotiations, Locarno was a disaster. By 
guaranteeing Germany’s borders in the west, but not in the east, the Western great 
powers had created a situation whereby German revisionism in the east was greatly 
facilitated. Locarno exposed Polish aspirations to sit at table with the great powers as 
an equal power as mere wishful thinking. Nevertheless, nearly all Poles clung to their 
perceptions of Poland as a great power with unimpaired tenacity. As part of Locarno, 
Germany would re-enter the League of Nations, and, as a great power, it had been 
promised a permanent seat on the League’s Council. Warsaw reacted by demanding 
that Poland, too, should be given a permanent seat.40 Poland was in fact refused a 
a move which that confirms the assumption that the great powers perceived some kind 
Central European region between Germany and Russia as existing, Czechoslovakia 
was made to relinquish its temporary seat, and the Assembly Council was asked to 
Poland instead. It was understood that Poland would expect to hang ontokeep its 
on a quasi-permanent basis. 
The picture painted above here brings out Poland’s constant aspirations to 
become a great powerhood, but it also shows that the policies designed to carry out 
those aspirations varied with the changes in the general balance of power in Europe. 
In the years immediately after World War I, with Germany and Russia temporarily 
weakened, Poland tried to go it alone. Later, with Germany and Russia ascending, 
Poland looked to France. When that policy proved unsuccessful, Poland once again 
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tried to go it alone by distancing itself from Germany and Russia in equal measure, 
and also from France and the League. Poland signed a non-aggression pact with the 
Soviet Union in 1932, and one with Germany in 1934. The ensuing go it alone policy 
is by definition at loggerheads with a policy based on civilizational standards. On the 
contrary, it is a strategy based on the idea that material capabilities will suffice to 
maintain great power status. 
Such a change is in direct evidence in Polish policy from the mid-1930s 
onwards. Regarding formal standards, Poland withdrew from the League of Nation’s 
minority rights scheme, refusing to comply with it until such time when all other 
European states would also do so.41 John Maynard Keynes even characterized the new 
Poland as “an economic impossibility whose only industry is Jew-baiting.”42 
Regarding alliance policy, in 1934, plans for an “Eastern Pact” were being prepared 
within the framework provided by the League Covenant. This Eastern Pact would 
consist of a regional mutual assistance pact, a Franco-Soviet guarantee pact, and a 
general treaty signed by all participants. France would be the guarantor, and the 
Soviet Union would assume obligations towards France as if it were a signatory of 
Locarno. The pact needed Polish support to be realized. However, Poland’sish 
Fforeign Mminister Jόzef Beck regarded it as a “form of a big concern, this time 
French, to push Poland down.”43 In 1937, true to the new program of going it alone, 
produced a new plan for establishing a neutral bloc between Germany and Russia.44 
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Poland’s overtures towards its smaller neighbors in the interwar period all failed. 
Breaking with the basic civilizational standard of non-use of military force, Poland 
turned to the use of force instead, and so lost out on civilizational standards. 
Following the 1938 Anschluss, Poland presented Lithuania with an ultimatum, and 
was only in this way able to establish diplomatic relations with Kaunas. Then, after 
the German intervention in Sudetenland, Beck, thinking that Czechoslovakia was a 
dispensable quantity, seized the opportunity to take Teschen by force of arms.45 
Predictably, the great powers did not accommodate Poland’s go- it- alone-
based status-seeking. The principal authority on Polish interwar policy, Piotr 
Wandycz, approvingly cites the French military attaché to Poland in the mid-1930s, 
who “spoke disparagingly of the intoxicating ‘great power elixir,’ served to the Polish 
public periodically by the governmental press.”46 As late as in 1936, following an 
exclamation by Polish Foreign Minister Beck that Poland was a great power, French 
Foreign Minister Barthou ridiculed this by repeating that Poland was a great power, 
and, after a pregnant pause, added, “a very big power.”47 Poland chose to disregard 
the lack of status accommodation, and continued to voice its status claim on the level 
of public debate as well as on the highest level of state. In September 1939, Germany 
and the Soviet Union split the region between themselves. The Polish campaign to be 
accommodated as a great power ended in tears. 
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To sum up, Poland’s claim of the great power status of the state’s previous 
incarnation as eighteenth- century Poland, was prominent domestically, but not taken 
seriously internationally. In terms of moral standing, after Piłsudski’s military coup in 
1926, Poland was no longer a democracy. This meant that the principal ground on 
which it sought status, namely civilizational standards, was jeopardized, – for within 
the League, democratic standards held sway. With the increasing breaking of specific 
standards from the mid-1930s on, and culminating in the threat of war with Lithuania 
and the land grab of Teschen, Poland effectively shifted the grounds of its status-
seeking from civilizational standards to material capabilities. When Britain made the 
German infringement of Poland’s sovereignty a casus belli in 1939, Britain it did so in 
terms that unequivocally confirmed Poland’s civilizational credentials, but nowhere 
was it argued that they were exemplary. That was thoroughly overdetermined, since 
the great powers at no point accommodated Poland’s campaign to be treated as a great 
power. It is evident that the claims in terms of civilizational standards did not suffice 
to secure status accommodation of Poland as a great power. The obvious conclusion is 
that references to civilizational standards were not a sufficient condition to be 
accommodated as a great power. Indeed, the literature is rife with other examples of 
this, with India as a particularly important example. Baldev Nayar and T. V. Paul 
demonstrate how Nehru’s India was rich in the civilizational standard of moral 
fortitude, without this being enough to give it the status of great power.48 The 
difference was that this was very clear indeed to Nehru, who argued, “we are not a 
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Power that counts; potentially we are very much so.”49 In Poland, there was no such 
insight. 
In terms of material capabilities, German and Russian weakness proved to be 
ephemeral, and Poland’s relative standing in this regard sank drastically throughout 
the interwar period. Poland was not fully represented at the Locarno conference, 
proved unable to build or even participate in alliances, and reneged on its treaty 
obligations without having the material base to do so with impunity. Still, an 
overwhelming number of Poles stuck to the perception that Poland was a great power. 
Characteristically, as late as in 1938, just before the Polish military detachments were 
to collapse like a deck of cards before German and Russian forces, the former Polish 
ambassador to Moscow and Paris, Juliusz Łukasiewicz, published a book 
programmatically titled Polska jest mocarstwem (– “Poland is a power)”, by which he 
meant a great power.50 Status-seeking may go on, even when the two principal 
grounds on which to seek it – civilizational standing and material capabilities – have 
both failed, and even though no other state takes the effort seriously. Poles trusted 
honor – the “outward recognition we gain from others in response to our excellence” 
– to secure great power status for them.51 They forgot that honor is different from 
status, in that it is not enough to be true to your own standards. Status is competitive, 
in that one also has to outcompete other status-seekers, and here Poland failed. From 
the mid-1930s, they failed doubly, in that they did not live up to their own standard of 
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excellence, and so slipped up not only where status was concerned, but also in terms 
ofon honor. 
<space> 
<A> Trust in the Material: Weberian Russians 
According to official Soviet historiography, “beginning from the mid-seventeenth 
century onwards, Russia already played a most important role in the political life of 
Eastern Europe, so that no international problem could any longer be solved without 
her participation.”52 Anisimov concurs when he usefully sketches out a tripartite 
journey into international society: “The first step that Russia took into the 
Westphalian world of international relationsIR was its participation in the First 
Northern War (1655–60), a step determined by the decision of 1654 on the 
subjugation of the Ukraine. The next step was taken in 1686 by the Eternal Peace with 
the Rech Pospolita [that is, Poland-Lithuania].”53 This is not only due to the way both 
largely proceeded to draw up theis treaty according to the general standard of the day, 
but also because Russia at this time also succeeded in its long struggle to form an 
alliance with key powers (with the Empire, Venice, Brandenburg, and Poland-
Lithuania against the Ottoman Porte). The third step, Anisimov argues, was taken hot 
on the heels of Peter’s Grand Embassy 1697–1698, when he grasped the potential of 
alliance with states that his predecessors had considered untouchable for religious 
reasons, forin a war against Sweden, Poland-Lithuania, and the Porte. Westernization 
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greatly speeded up by Peter the Great’s famous Grand Embassy. Peterson outlines 
how one crucial set of techniques, those of government, were imported first and 
foremost from Sweden, with attempts to fit them onto Russian social conditions.54 
Historians universally stress the role of the Great Northern War (1701–1721) in 
establishing Russia as a central player in international society. It was the war that 
broke out on the eve of the new century which that really brought Russia in.55 
The leading eighteenth- century specialist Hans Bagger even argues that 
“T[t]he Peace of Nystadt on 30 August 1721 confirmed the position that Russia had 
attained as a great power during the Great Northern War. […] As a consequence of its 
new status as a great power, Russia became a European state insofar as the Russian 
Empire had to be incorporated into the system of European international relations.”56 
Now “the courts of Europe could no longer ignore Russia as a semibarbarian state,” 
but had to take it into account.57 Note, however, that Bagger explicitly brackets how 
Russia was still classified as semi-barbarian (as opposed to civilized) when he confers 
great power status upon it. The tension identified by Bagger where Russia is 
concerned –, between a clear military potential on the one hand and a lack of 
civilizational level, on the other – mirrors the tension in status previously noted 
above. Furthermore, Bagger produces a quote from Russian Vice-Chancellor Peter 
Shafirov to demonstrate that Russian statesmen themselves knew full well that “a few 
decades ago, in the states of Europe people thought and wrote of the nation and state 
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of Russia in the same way as they did of the Indian, Persian and other nations [… 
had] no intercourse with Europe whatsoever, apart from a little trade.”58 Shafirov also 
stated that Russians knew very well that the greater part of our their neighbors view 
unfavourably the good position in which it has pleased God to place us; that they 
would be delighted should an occasion present itself to imprison us once more in our 
earlier obscurity and that if they seek our alliance it is rather through fear and hate 
than through feelings of friendship.59 
Crucially, as seen by that key Russian statesman, Russia had the material 
power but lacked the social mores required to be fully recognized. Shafirov proved to 
be the first in a long series of Russians who saw things this way, but who were not 
heard; the leadership kept on privileging materiality. Here we may note how Peter 
experienced problems marrying off his offspring – the ultimate snub in an age of 
dynasticism. In 1724, Peter managed to marry off his daughter Anna Petrovna to the 
Dduke of Holstein-Gottorp at Swedish behest. In 1745, feelers from British throne 
pretender Charles Edward Stuart were sent out regarding Elizabeth, but nothing came 
of thisit. Even at the end of the century, when Emperor Paul tried to marry off his 
daughter to the kKing of Sweden, the project still stranded, on the issue of religion. 
During the sixty years following the Great Northern War, Russia became 
gradually more successful in being recognized as a worthwhile ally, a power entitled 
to participation in peace settlements and a power mentioned in treaties as a guarantor 
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of the peace. Russia attended its first Peace Congress at Soissons in 1728–1730.60 In 
the War of the Polish Succession, Russia, by dint among other things of having 
fielded an army about 30,000 men strong, was definitely a player. However, Russia 
was conspicuously absent when it came to the peace settlement.61 But come the Seven 
Years’ War (1756–1763, known in the United States as the French and Indian Wars), 
Russia was a key player in the basic change in alliance patterns that precipitated the 
war. According to Craig and George, this was when the term “great power” became a 
part of the “general political vocabulary,” and at the time of this war it was considered 
“normal and right” that there should be five great powers.62 Still, Paul Kennedy 
quotes the French minister Choiseul to the effect that: 
[I]n the present state of Europe it is colonies, trade and in consequence sea 
power, which must determine the balance of power upon the continent. The 
House of Austria, Russia, the King of Britain are only powers of the second 
rank, as are all those which cannot go to war unless subsidized by the trading 
powers.63 
This is a useful reminder that the hierarchy may not have been as fixed as 
Craig and George hold. To the materially minded, this is when Russia became a great 
power: “By the Seven Years War the Russian army was the largest in Europe, the 
establishment aimed for at its commencement consisting of 162,430 men in field 
regiments, 74,548 garrison troops, 27,758 men in the landmilitsiia, 12,937 members 
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of the corps of engineering and artillery, and 44,000 irregulars.”64 The Seven Years’ 
War seems to be an important turning point also in the sense that Russia apparently 
restrained its military campaign short of crushing Prussia in order to keep that state in 
a shape where it could continue to play an important part in the workings of the 
balance of Europe. In other words, Russia had entered into the management of the 
state system to the extent of downplaying immediate interests for what were held to 
be more long-term ones. 
During the following decades, Russia also became a “great responsible” of the 
system. Adam Watson indicates the Empress Elizabeth’s secret negotiations with the 
heads of France and Austria in 1760 as the crucial date. Certainly, by dint of the role 
Russia played in all three of Poland’s partitions, this criterion was firmly fulfilled by 
the end of the century.65 If 1760 marked an informal breakthrough, the 1779 Treaty of 
Teschen was a formal one, inasmuch as Russia became for the first time a guarantor 
power.66 
Official Soviet diplomatic history stresses how Russia’s 1783 convention with 
Turkey, as well as developments in the law of the sea, gave Russia a practical role in 
the formation of international law – definitely another breakthrough in terms of 
managing the system.67 By the end of the century, Russia was a fully- fledged 
participant in the formation of alliances. For example, as of 1780, Russia was a 
member of the League of Armed Neutrality, which also counted Denmark and 
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Portugal. Twenty years later, a successor was formed, now consisting of Russia, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia. In 1800, the new Russian Eemperor Paul ordered the 
College of Foreign Affairs to draw up a comprehensive analysis of Russia’s current 
standing and future prospects in terms of foreign policy. In the report, the College 
characterized Russia as “the world’s leading power,”, a “Hercules,” etcand so forth.68 
In terms of materiality, there is no doubt that Russia had become a great power 
by the end of the eighteenth century. There remained no doubt about its Christian 
credentials, the principle of legitimacy was the same as in the other powers;, and 
dynastic intermarriages had become common. Still, European complaints about 
Russia’s lack of civility and the continuing doubt about the extent to which it should 
be considered to be “of Europe” continued unabated. David Hume, for one, 
complained that “the two most civilized nations, the English and French, should be in 
decline; and the barbarians, the Goths and the Vandals of Germany and Russia, 
should be in power and renown.”69 Variants of this complaint were heard in other 
forms and in other arenas. For example, in 1804, the French Aambassador to St. 
Petersburg Hédouville complained to his Foreign Minister Talleyrand: “There is no 
other foreign court where the diplomatic corps is less informed on political 
dispositions and proceedings than here.”70 
The reason why Russia did not provide information to its corps diplomatique 
reflected a penchant for secretiveness in all dealings with foreigners that Russia had 
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taken over from the Mongols.71 Here I think we have the key to why Russia was not 
accepted as a great power. By the lights of the established great powers, its state was 
not in order – and, as Hegel was about to work out in great detail, the ordering of the 
state was the key criterion of “civilization.” As underlined by Frederick the Great and 
other politicians of the time, if regarded as a police state, Russia was less successful 
than others: 
He [Frederick] says, for instance, let us compare Holland with Russia: Russia 
may have the largest territory of any European state, but it is mostly made up 
of swamps, forests, and deserts, and is inhabited by miserable groups of 
people totally destitute of activity and industry; if one takes Holland, on the 
other hand, with its tiny territory, again mostly marshland, we find that it 
nevertheless possesses such a population, such wealth, such commercial 
activity, and such a fleet as to make it an important European state, something 
that Russia is only beginning to become.72 
The capacity for state action was less efficient and more limited. Also, in 
Europe, societies were emerging and states were changing their way of handling 
societies from being one of direct rule to one of indirect governance. In Europe, this 
period saw the gradual emergence of liberal forms of governing that replaced the 
police state, and society gradually replaced territory as the object of reference for 
governing. In degrees that became weaker the further east from Britain in Europe one 
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moved, liberalism understood as concrete social practice firmed its grip. A whole 
plethora of Europeans argued that, eventually, Russia had to take cognizance of the 
change. Writing under the alias of Ivan Aletof, Voltaire cast Russia in the role of an 
apprentice to European civilization, a “Scythian voyaging to Athens” coming to Paris 
in order to be enlightened.73 In summing up the reign of Catherine the Great, Bruce 
Lincoln places the emphasis on how one cause of its social policy was that Russia’s 
“status as a Great Power” imposed an imperative for civil peace, which again imposed 
heightened efficiency on the Russian administration. He goes on to note another 
factor which that added to this imposition: that a number of young Russian 
bureaucrats held that, to a Europe dominated by Enlightenment thinking, the pre-
modern military and fiscal concerns of Muscovite tTsars conformed poorly to the 
image of a gGreat Ppower that their sovereigns hoped to project. To be sure, Russia’s 
military needs continued to be greater than ever, but, as a great power, it also must 
exhibit some proper concern for her its citizens.74 
In other words, a new ethos of what governing a state entailed was setting a 
new standard not only for what a state had to be in order to be considered well-
ordered, but also,, and as a corollary, for which states should be considered great 
powers. Russia’s great power status-seeking ambitions were thwarted by the emergent 
standard of civilization, a symbolic factor. Material capability alone proved to be not 
enough. Mutatis mutandis, this theme has complicated Russian status-seeking ever 
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since. Consider how, as Stalin emerged out of World War IIthe Second World War 
military power of the Eurasian continent, Konrad Adenauer wrote in 1946 to William 
Sollmann that “Asia stands on the Elbe” or how, taking on board Western 
representations of the Soviet Union, a central slogan of the perestroika period (1986–
1991) was the need for Russia to “return to civilization.”.75 
<space> 
<A> Conclusions 
The case of Poland in the interwar period has demonstrated that, in order to be 
acknowledged as a great power, a state must be perceived as possessing a certain 
amount of material resources that are translatable to military capability. Durkheim 
was correct in specifying that it is societies, not states, that “can have their pride, not 
in being the greatest or the wealthiest, but in being the most just, the best organized 
and in possessing the best moral constitution.”76 Such symbolic capital may be 
converted to status in international relationsIR – but not to the status of great power. 
Inversely, the case of eighteenth- century Russia should demonstrate that 
material capability alone does not make a great power. This conclusion is at odds with 
Wohlforth’s work, which, based on neo-realist tenets, provides a functionalist analysis 
of Russia’s road to greatness.77 If we return to the two-by-two matrix that summed up 
part onethe beginning of this Cchapter (see Table 4.1 above) and specify it in light of 
discussion, the following result emerges (see Table 4.3): 
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Table 4.3 Here 
<space> 
During the interwar period, Poland started as a normative power aspiring to be 
a great power. It failed.: iIt lost out in terms of relative capabilities, and, at the end of 
the period, it also compromised civilizational standards. Instead of a northerly 
direction, Poland ended up taking a westerly one, and came close to ending up as a 
peripheral power. As for Russia, it started the eighteenth century as a military power 
and inched its way in an easterly direction, but not far enough to become a great 
power. 
Poland learnedt from its mistakes, and has not pursued great power status 
since 1939. The repercussions of the sequence discussed here concern include a 
certain distrust by neighboring powers, particularly Lithuania, and these do not 
concern us here. Where Russia is concerned, however, the discussion above has 
repercussions for the situation today. Contrary to Wohlforth, I would argue that 
Russia’s status deficit remained even in the wake of the Napoleonic Wwars, and that 
it has, nolens volens, remained even since. Further, I would argue that the issue at 
stake is how Russia has been represented by Western great powers: as a state that 
does not pass muster according to the standards of civilization. Beginning in the late 
1980s, post-Soviet leaders themselves began to identify the root cause of their 
uneasiness vis-à-vis the West in civilizational terms. One of the key slogans of the 
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perestroika period was the need to “rejoin civilization” – which logically implied that 
the Soviet path had somehow led Russians away from it. With the fall of 
Ccommunism, the official Russian self-understanding of the Soviet past came to 
blame a mistaken system of governance for the lingering problems in what was 
frequently referred to as the “civilized world.” For example, when Vladimir Putin 
addressed the nation at the millennium, he said: 
Soviet power did not let the country develop a flourishing society which could 
be developing dynamically, with free people. First and foremost, the 
ideological approach to the economy made our country lag increasingly 
behind (otstavanie) the developed states. It is bitter to admit that for almost 
seven decades we travelled down a blind alley, which took us away from the 
main track of civilization […]. Russia will not soon, if ever, be a replica of, 
say, the US or Great Britain, where liberal values have deep-seated traditions. 
For us, the state, with its institutions and structures, always played an 
exclusively important role in the life of the country and its people. For the 
Russian (rossiyanin), a strong state is not an anomaly, not something with 
which he has to struggle, but, on the contrary, a source of and a guarantee for 
order, as well as the initiator and main moving force of any change. 
Contemporary Russian society does not mistake a strong and effective state 
for a totalitarian one.78 
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This could be read as a plea for recognition of great powerhood status on new 
of democracy and market economy – that is, , i.e. according to the present-day 
civilization (human rights, neoliberalism). Ostensibly, this is a liberal model. But note 
that the Russian leader is trapped within a problematicque of order, with a strong state 
appearing as the guarantor of the system of governance. The problem is that the 
model of governance that Russia pledges to implement here runs directly against the 
key liberal trend, where the question is always is how the state may govern less. 
view of what a state should do is the exact opposite. The Russian state should rule in 
direct fashion, not govern from afar. What this means is that Russia is once again 
evolving a rationality of government that has firm precedents in Western Europe, but 
that has since been abandoned by Western European states themselves. One corollary 
of evolving a different rationality of government is that the specific social practices to 
which those rationalities give rise will differ. And indeed, notable differences do exist 
between Russia and Western Europe regarding ownership, freedom of contract, 
judiciary and penal practices, health administration, and a whole swathe of other 
practices. A further corollary is that, as seen from Western Europe, Russia is once 
again rigged with a system of governance that jeopardizes its possible standing as a 
great power. 
Via an alternative route, I reach the same conclusion as Larson and 
Shevchenko: that Russia’s standing as a great power must remain in serious doubt. 
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Russia’s nuclear arsenal and what a rRealist would judge to be its sphere of influence 
Central Asia count in its favor.79 So does the size of its armed forces, but the weight 
of this factor evaporates if we correlate for quality of personnel and equipment. As 
seen by its inability to use military power efficiently and effectively (most 
conspicuously in Chechnya), Russia falls short on a key material criterion: the ability 
to project military power that is on par with (other) great powers. Today’s Russia also 
falls short on most other material criteria such as technological innovation, not to 
mention size of population and gross national budget. 
Russia ostensibly shares a moral purpose and a whole string of norms with the 
(other) leading powers of the system. It is one of five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council, and, following the demise of the Soviet Union, it 
became a member of the Group of 7 (G7), which became the Group of 8 (G8). Russia 
is also a member of key international institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), and participates in a wide range of international regimes. 
However, Russia’s membership portfolio is patchy, with key economic institutions 
lacking and the overall total of institutional and regime memberships being 
considerably smaller than, for example, that of France. Furthermore, as recurrently 
noted in the literature on Russia’s role within international organizations such as the 
United Nations (UN) system or within regimes such as those in the area of human 
Russia tends to wield its influence by veto rather than by initiative. It rarely plays a 
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leading role within these institutions. These observable facts all sow doubt about the 
degree to which Russia actually does share a moral purpose with the other powers of 
the system. 
During its heyday in the eighteenth century, liberalism posed the question of 
great powerhood status in terms of a “standard of civilization,” turning around the 
character of the state. Liberalism came to dominate in such a degree that this became 
the “natural” way in which to discuss global politics. Today, neo-liberalism imposes a 
similar discursive order, by bringing to bear a set of criteria in global politics that 
centers on governance. Like liberalism in an earlier era, it is rapidly emerging as the 
“natural” way to discuss such global political questions as the relative standing of 
powers. The issue of compatible rationalities of government lies at the heart of 
struggles over globalization and system transformation. In various discourses (for 
example, on development, or on women’s rights) neo-liberal standards for what 
should be considered good governance have long been dominant, already well 
described empirically, and thoroughly theorized. It is high time for scholars working 
within the field of International RelationsIR to shed their presuppositions about the 
non-importance of social factors for state relations, and to begin to realize that the rise 
of hegemonic nNeo-Lliberalism is relevant for other discourses on global politics as 
– not least the one on great power hoodstatus. 
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With the coming to power of Vladimir Putin in 2000, the official line 
continued to be that Russia remained a great power, but one that now sought 
recognition in terms of democracy and market economy. This might appear to be a 
liberal model – but only on the surface. In a work on the 1905 reforms in Russia, 
Weber once characterized the new system of government as 
Scheinkonstitutionalismus – fake constitutionalism. Putin’s use of liberal catchwords 
like ‘“the rule of law’” has been equally lacking in seriousness and practical purchase. 
To quote but one of many analysts who single out this as a key development, 
Viatcheslav Morozov writes: 
As the liberal reforms of the social security system failed, the government 
tended to opt for paternalistic solutions, such as the measures aimed at raising 
nativity rates, demonstrating that the stronger state is better in providing 
security to the people. Foreign policy came to be dominated by the idea of 
establishing Russia as a strong and independent player on the global stage – 
here, as in domestic politics, autonomy became an end in itself.80 
The thinking about government which is promulgated by slogans like 
“managed democracy,” “sovereign democracy,” etc. and so forth is predicated on the 
idea that a strong state may serve as the guarantee of the system of governance. The 
problem is that the model of governance that Russia pledges to implement here runs 
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directly counter to a key liberal trend, where the question is always is how the state 
govern less. Once again, the Russian state is opting for direct rule. 
In the final analysis, in order to achieve and maintain the status of a great 
power, social compatibility is essential. TWhen, to quote a paradigmatic voice from 
today’s Russia, Natal’ya Narochnitskaya argues that Russia “haunts Europe, which, 
having built its ‘paradise on earth,’ remains apprehensive of our magnitude and our 
capacity to withstand all challenges.,” 81 sShe sums up the problem neatly.82 It is not 
enough to parade what Russia itself considers “strength” in order to be recognized as 
a great power. That would be to commit the same error as did Poland in the interwar 
period: to seek status according to criteria that the relevant circle of recognition does 
not find to be of relevance.83 What is needed is to demonstrate strength and power 
recognized as being of a sort that makes its wielder a great power in the eyes of the 
firmly ensconced great powers. If that is what it takes to be recognized as a great 
power, then Russia is playing the wrong game. 
That is, if the game remains the same. Here we have made the assumption that 
civilizational standards, in the sense of sharing and working towards maintaining a 
certain kind of international order, is a necessary, but not sufficient, prerequisite for 
being established as a great power. The choice of time frames and cases has led to a 
Euro-centric specification regarding the kind of international order that made up part 
of the matrix for the great power game studied. While this may be warranted for 
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historical study, it is the consensus of this volume that such Euro-centrism is now past 
its due date.84 
We are now in the midst of an intense struggle about what kind of 
international order will make up the matrix for future great power seeking.85 While I 
would maintain that the general set-up of this chapter is valid, the temporal area of 
validity for the specific concept of civilizational standards used would no longer hold, 
for status emerges within a specific civilizational context. If a standard of civilization 
based on human rights and neo-liberalism prevails, then adherence to such a standard 
will remain crucial to great power status-seeking. If it does not, then some new and 
yet unknown intersubjectively determined concept of civilizational standards will take 
the place now occupied by neoliberalism.86 Russia may, or may not, score better on 
practical norm fulfillment of such a hypothetical standard of civilization. The 
historical record so far indicates that Russia has had problems with norm fulfillment 
according to all previously operating standards.87 If the problem boils down to 
following any standard that is not domestically determined, then Russia’s great power 
status-seeking will in all probability remain elusive. 
Charles Tilly famously quipped that states make war and war makes states. 
Furthermore, realists have long argued that war is the crucible wherein great powers 
are forged. My two cases support that argument. World War I re-made Poland, and 
the way Poland fared in World War II unmade the Polish hankering after the status of 
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great power. In the case of Russia, the Great Northern War, the Napoleonic Wars and, 
we may add, World War II definitely helped its status-seeking, but that was not 
enough to establish Russia as a fully -fledged great power. Judged by the historical 
record and, within the modern system of states, war victories seem to be a necessary 
but not a sufficient precondition for being accommodated as a great power. To end on 
a normative note, one reason for the particular appositeness of the topic of this 
volume lies exactly here. We may piously hope that today’s status-seeking by rising 
powers will break the historical pattern, so that accommodation may take place 
without war. 
42 
Table 4.1. Durkheimian and Weberian Ggreat pPower cCriteria. 
 Civilizational Standards 
  High Low 
Material Resources High W+, D+ W+, D-− 
Low W-−, D+ W−-, D-− 
Table 4.2 Perceived Population in Millions and Size of Armed Forces by Manpower for Poland, 
Czechoslovakia, Lithuania, France, Germany, and the USSR for the Years 1922 and 1937. 
  Population Size of Armed Forces 
 1922 1937 1922 1937 
Poland  27 32 255,000 265,000 
Czechoslovakia  13 13 150,000 165,000 
Lithuania  5 2.5 50,000 22,000 
France *39* 42 390,000 485,000 
Germany 60 66 100,000 555,000 
USSR 131=** 166=** 5,300,000 1,300,000 
*Metropolitan forces only. ** =Given as European Russia, (i.e., west of the Urals). Sources: 
The Statesman’s Yearbook, 1922 and 1937 (London: Macmillan, 1922 and 1938). 
Table 4.3 Four Types of Powers, Defined in Terms of Degrees of Capabilities and Civilizational 
Standard Fulfillment. 
  Degree of Fulfilling Civilizational Standards 
  High Low 
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Degree of Capabilites High Great Powers Military Powers 
Low Normative Powers Peripheral Powers 
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